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MISSOURI SECTION
TORTS-DAMAGES AND INJUNCTION FOR INDUCING
BREACH OF CONTRACT
Defendant, a corporate competitor of plaintiff, persuaded plain-
tiff's customers to break their contracts by misrepresenting that
plaintiff was insolvent, unreliable, and unable to perform its con-
tracts, and further offered to indemnify the customers against
liability. For such breaches, plaintiff brought suit for damages
and an injunction against malicious conduct calculated to induce
others to break their contracts with plaintiff. The trial court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss, and plaintiff appealed. On
appeal, held: reversed and remanded. Legal equitable relief can
be granted for malicious interference with plaintiff's business
and contractual relations.'
Prior to this decision, Missouri had long belonged to the minor-
ity of jurisdictions' which does not recognize the liability of a
third party for inducing another to break his contract.3 The
minority decisions are based upon the dissent of Coleridge, J., in
the case of Lumley v. Gye,4 which argues that the law should con-
fine its remedies to the contracting parties, and to damages di-
rectly and proximately consequential to the act of the defendant.5
The Missouri Supreme Court adopted the minority rule forty-
four years after Lumley v. Gye in the leading case of Glencoe
Sand & Gravel Co. v. Hudson Bros. Commission Co.6
1. Downey v. United Weatherproofing, Inc., 253 S.W.2d 976 (Mo. 1953).
2. See Note, 84 A.L.R. 43, 74-76 (1933).
3. For an historical analysis of the tort, see Sayre, Inducing Breach of
Contract, 36 HARV. L. REv. 663 (1923). For an excellent discussion, see
Harper, Interference with Contractual Relations, 47 NORTHWESTERN U. L.
REv. 873 (1953). Other comments and discussions may be found in RESTATE-
MENT, TORTS § 766 (1939); Notes, 33 COL. L. REv. 90 (1933); 39 HARv. L.
REV. 749 (1946) ; 3 RUTGERS L. Rnv. 277 (1949) ; Comment, 61 HARV. L. RErv.
897 (1948) ; 84 A.L.R. 43 (1933).
4. 2 El. & BI. 216, 244, 118 Eng. Rep. 749, 759 (1853).
5. Id. at 246, 118 Eng. Rep. at 760.
6. 138 Mo. 439, 40 S.W. 93 (1897). Plaintiff contracted with Missouri
Pacific Railroad to transport quantities of sand and gravel from plaintiff's
land to market. Defendant company represented itself as owner of the
land and threatened Missouri Pacific with a trespass prosecution. Missouri
Pacific then refused to transport any more sand or gravel from plaintiff's
land. The court held that a third person was not liable for maliciously in-
ducing a breach of contract, on the ground that the direct and proximate
cause of plaintiff's damage was the voluntary breach of contract on the part
of the other party, to whom resort should be had for compensation for the
injurious consequences. MacFarlane, J., speaking for a unanimous court,
said:
•.. We are unable to see, in principle, that there is a difference be-
tween a breach indaced by the advice, persuasion, or even threats, of a
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The court, in the principal case, abandoned its prior decisions
and expressed its desire to follow the majority7 of jurisdictions in
adopting the rule of Lumley v. Gye8 and Temperton v. Russell,
which allows recovery against a defendant for maliciously induc-
ing a third party to break his contract. The court defines "mal-
ice''1° in law as the intentional doing of a harmful act without
justification or excuse, not necessarily connoting spite or ill will. ,1'
The court changed the law because it felt that the rights of the
parties to an existing contract are important in the business
world and that they should be protected from intentional and un-
third party, and one caused by circumstances connected with the busi-
ness or service the party contracted to do .... There is no charge in
the petition that the railroad company was caused to refuse to carry
out its contract, or was rendered unable to do so, contrary to its will, by
the fraud, deceit, or coercion of defendant. The direct and proximate
cause of plaintiff's damage is the voluntary breach of contract on the
part of the carrier, and resort must be had to it for compensation for
the injurious consequences.
If defendant committed no legal wrong, though his act resulted in
damage to plaintiff, the law affords no remedy. It is damnum, absque
injuria. The motive of the defendant is immaterial.
Id. at 455, 40 S.W. at 94.
7. RESTATEMIENT, ToRTs § 766 (1939). That the view of allowing relief is
the majority, see Note, 84 A.L.R. 43, 69-74 (1933).
8. 2 El. & B1. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (1853). Defendant induced Wagner,
who had agreed with plaintiff to perform and sing for him and no one else
for a certain term, to break her contract. The court held:
t * * [A]n action lies for maliciously procuring a breach of contract
to give exclusive personal services . . . provided the procurement ...
produces damages: and.., that the action would lie for the malicious
procurement of the breach of any contract, though not for personal
services, if by the procurement damage was intended to result and did
result to the plaintiff.
Ibid. For an interesting discussion on the limitations of the Lumley v. Gye
doctrine, see 17 CORNELL L. Q. 509 (1932).
9. [1893] 1 Q.B. 715, 723. The holding of Lumley v. Gye was extended:
"The principle upon which Lumley v. Gye... depend[s] is.... not confined
to contracts for personal service."
10. Downey v. United Weatherproofing, Inc., 253 S.W.2d 976, 980 (Mo.
1953).
11. Brennan v. United Hatters, 73 N.J.L. 729, 744, 65 Atl. 165, 171(1906): ".... [M]alice in the law means nothing more than the intentional
doing of a wrongful act without justification or excuse." The court in
Caverno v. Fellows, 300 Mass. 331, 337, 15 N.E.2d 483, 487 (1938), correctly
expressed the idea that personal spite or ill will is not included in the con-
cept of malice as that term is used in this area, where it said: ". . . [I]n an
action for malicious interference with a contract . . .an 'intentional inter-
ference ...without lawful justification is malicious in law, even if it is
from good motives and without express malice.'" Cf. Mangum Electric Co.
v. Border, 101 Okla. 64, 222 Pac. 1002 (1924) and cases cited in Note, 84
A.L.R. 43, 50 (1933). See 36 HARV. L. REV. 663, 675-686 (1923).
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justifiable' interference from third persons.13 A person's right to
pursue any business, calling or profession he may choose, as well
as his rights to contract and to derive the profits and benefits of
services under his contracts, are all "property rights"'1 which the
law will protect. Conversely, the right to engage in competitive
business, use lawful means to solicit and procure it, and even to
persuade a competitor's prospective customers not to deal with
him, are also property rights which the law will protect.15 How-
ever, where actual malice and unlawful means are used, and the
wrongdoer's conduct is directed solely to the satisfaction of spite
12. As to justification and other defenses to this tort generally, see 2
COOLEY, TORTS 196 (4th ed. 1932); RESTATEMENT, TORTS §§ 767-774 (1939);
40 COL. L. REV. 1094 (1940); 33 MICH. L. Rnv. 943 (1935); 20 ORE. L. REV.
254 (1941); Notes, 9 A.L.R.2d 228, 259-270 (1950); 84 A.L.R. 43, 79-85
(1933).
13. Other theories supporting recognition of the right of action are: (1)
Liability results because the act induced is itself a wrong for which he who
procures it may be held liable as a joint wrongdoer; (2) Persuasion to
breach a contract deprives one of something to which he has a legal right,
i.e., the benefits of its performance. These theories are discussed and cases
cited in Note, 84 A.L.R. 43, 73 (1933).
14. Downey v. United Weatherproofing, Inc., 253 S.W.2d 976, 980, 982
(Mo. 1953). It may perhaps be questioned whether these rights and anal-
ogous rights which also receive equitable protection, such as rights in trade
marks and names, are actually "property rights," but it seems clear that an
injunction restraining their violation may properly be issued. 1 Nmis, UN-
FAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS § 165 (4th ed. 1947).
15. In Passaic Print Works v. Ely & Walker Dry Goods Co., 150 Fed. 163
(8th Cir. 1900), cert. denied, 181 U.S. 617 (1900), plaintiff was a corpora-
tion engaged in the manufacture of calicoes, which it sold through its agents
to wholesalers. Defendant companies, being overstocked in calicoes, offered
them generally for sale at very much lower prices than the plaintiffs, stating
in their advertisements that the sale was limited to their present stock.
Plaintiff brought suit for damages caused by loss of trade and customers.
The trial court sustained the demurrer to plaintiff's petition. In affirming,
the Court of Appeals held:
*.. The right to offer property for sale, and to fix the price at which
it may be bought, is incident to the ownership of property, and the loss
which a third party sustains in consequence of the exercise of that right
is damnum absque injuria. We are thus confronted with the inquiry
whether the motive which influenced the defendant company . . .
changed the complexion of the act, and rendered the same unlawful,
when, but for the motive of the actor, it would have been clearly lawful.
... It has been well observed that it would be dangerous to the peace
of society to admit the doctrine that any lawful act can be transformed
prima facie into an actionable wrong by a simple allegation that the
act was inspired by malice or ill will, or by an improper motive. It is
wiser, therefore, to exclude any inquiry into the motives of men when
their actions are lawful, except in those cases where it is well estab-
lished that malice is an essential ingredient of the cause of action, or
in those cases where, the act done being wrongful, proof of a bad mo-
tive will serve to exaggerate the damages.
Id. at 166, 167. See also RESTAT!EMENT, TORTS § 768 (1939).
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or ill will and not to the advancement of his competitive interests,
he is not exercising, and is not entitled to invoke, his privileges as
a competitor.
The defendant contended that the injunction in the principal
case would be chiefly against defamation. The court agreed that
injunctions solely against defamation are only to be issued with
utmost caution,16 but held that an injunction may be granted to
restrain defendant from violating the property rights of the
plaintiff by the defamatory inducement of a third person to
break an existing contract with the plaintiff.
Thus, as the Supreme Court of Missouri now declares the law,
the plaintiff in an action for inducing breach of ,contract, may
recover damages 7 or obtain an injunction or both, simply by
showing "malice," in the limited sense defined above, without
proof of fraud and deceit or of coercion.
16. Downey v. Weatherproofing, Inc., 253 S.W.2d 976, 983 (Mo. 1953).
17. The elements of the cause of action are: an intentional and unpriv-
ileged inducement, with knowledge of the contract, resulting in breach and
damages to the plaintiff. See 50 M IcH. L. Rv. 781 (1952) and cases cited in
Note, 84 A.L.R. 43, 47-52 (1933). In Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contracts,
36 HARV. L. REV. 633 (1923), the author says:
'..[T]he majority [of states] accept it [the doctrine of liability] as
binding law. Unfortunately, however, where the doctrine has been ac-
cepted, there has been so little careful inquiry as to its precise limits
and fundamental nature that a somewhat uncertain law has resulted.
Id. at 671, 672. It may be wondered how far the Missouri courts will apply
the doctrine as embraced by the general language of the principal case. In
Brownstein v. Bricker, 226 Mo. App. 882, 46 S.W.2d 958 (1932) where
parents induced a daughter by persuasion to breach her engagement with
plaintiff, it was held that plaintiff did not have a cause of action against the
parents. Accord: RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 698 (1939). However, it may be
noted that while the Missouri court there cited cases from four other juris-
dictions (each of which still remains the law of the respective jurisdiction),
it relied for Missouri authority solely upon Glencoe Sand & Gravel v. Hud-
son Bros. Commission Co., 138 Mo. 439, 40 S.W. 93 (1897). Query whether,
based on the overruling of the Glencoe case supra, the Missouri courts will,
in the future, allow recovery for inducing a person to breach their engage-
ment to marry.
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